Alexandra Jewsevskyj v. Financial Recovery Services In by unknown
2017 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-14-2017 
Alexandra Jewsevskyj v. Financial Recovery Services In 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017 
Recommended Citation 
"Alexandra Jewsevskyj v. Financial Recovery Services In" (2017). 2017 Decisions. 533. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2017/533 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2017 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-4086 
_____________ 
 
ALEXANDRA JEWSEVSKYJ, ON BEHALF OF HERSELF  
AND ALL OTHERS SIMILARLY SITUATED, 
       Appellant 
 
v. 
 
FINANCIAL RECOVERY SERVICES, INC.;  
LVNV FUNDING, LLC;  
RESURGENT CAPITAL SERVICES, L.P.;  
ALEGIS GROUP, LLC 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-15-cv-03041) 
District Judge: Hon. Joel H. Slomsky 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 11, 2017 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., SHWARTZ, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed:  July 14, 2017) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
PER CURIAM 
 
                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
2 
 
 Alexandra Jewsevskyj brought a putative class action against Financial Recovery 
Services, Inc. (“FRS”), LVNV Funding, Inc., Resurgent Capital Services, L.P., and 
Alegis Group, LLC (collectively, “Defendants”), claiming that FRS did not provide 
Jewsevskyj adequate notice of her right to contest an alleged consumer debt, as required 
by § 1692g of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1692g.  
Jewsevskyj appeals the District Court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of 
Defendants, in which the Court concluded that a letter sent by FRS satisfied the statutory 
notice requirements.  Although the letter is printed in a small typeface and the words and 
spacing are compressed, the language is clear and effectively conveyed to Jewsevskyj her 
§ 1692g rights.  Therefore, we will affirm.1 
I 
 LVNV Funding is a corporation that purchases portfolios of consumer debt from 
various creditors and hires debt collection agencies to recover the moneys owed.  FRS is 
one such debt collection agency.2  FRS sent a letter to Jewsevskyj advising her that 
LVNV Funding purchased a debt she owed in the amount of $1,128.  The body of the 
letter is typed in all uppercase letters, in Times New Roman style, and in 8-point font.3  
                                              
1 Jewsevskyj alleges that LVNV Funding, Inc., Resurgent Capital Services, L.P., 
and Alegis Group, LLC are all vicariously liable for the conduct of FRS.  Because the 
District Court concluded that FRS had not violated the FDCPA, the District Court did not 
rule on the potential vicarious liability of the other defendants and we need not reach this 
issue. 
2 Defendants do not contest the District Court’s finding that FRS is a “debt 
collector” covered by the FDCPA.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).  
 3 We take judicial notice of the font, size, style, and spacing of the text based on a 
review of an electronic copy of the letter.  See Fed. R. Evid. 201(f) advisory committee’s 
note to 1972 proposed rules (“[J]udicial notice may be taken at any stage of the 
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There is minimal spacing between the lines in each of the three full paragraphs on the 
front page and thus the text is compressed.  The second paragraph of the letter contains 
what is commonly referred to as the “validation notice,” which describes a mechanism 
for Jewsevskyj to contest the debt.4 
 Jewsevskyj filed a class action complaint, alleging that this validation notice was 
not sufficiently prominent or readable to satisfy the statutory notice requirements of 
§ 1692g.  After discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  The 
District Court granted Defendants’ motion and denied Jewsevskyj’s, finding that, from 
the perspective of the “least sophisticated debtor,” the validation notice was not 
                                                                                                                                                  
proceedings, whether in the trial court or on appeal.”); cf. Kraft Foods Holdings, Inc. v. 
Helm, 205 F. Supp. 2d 942, 949 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (taking judicial notice of the fact that an 
“inverted ‘a’” appeared only once in a party’s exhibits). 
 4 Below is the text of the validation notice, set forth in Times New Roman 13-
point font, with single spacing, rather than the compressed format used in the letter: 
UNLESS YOU NOTIFY THIS OFFICE WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER 
RECEIVING THIS NOTICE THAT YOU DISPUTE THE VALIDITY OF 
THE DEBT OR ANY PORTION THEREOF, THIS OFFICE WILL 
ASSUME THIS DEBT IS VALID. IF YOU NOTIFY THIS OFFICE IN 
WRITING WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER RECEIVING THIS NOTICE 
THAT YOU DISPUTE THE VALIDITY OF THIS DEBT OR ANY 
PORTION THEREOF, THIS OFFICE WILL OBTAIN VERIFICATION 
OF THE DEBT OR OBTAIN A COPY OF A JUDGMENT AND MAIL 
YOU A COPY OF SUCH JUDGMENT OR VERIFICATION. IF YOU 
REQUEST THIS OFFICE IN WRITING WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER 
RECEIVING THIS NOTICE, THIS OFFICE WILL PROVIDE YOU 
WITH THE NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE ORIGINAL CREDITOR, 
IF DIFFERENT FROM THE CURRENT CREDITOR. THE 
OPPORTUNITES LISTED ABOVE DO NOT AFFECT YOUR RIGHTS 
DESCRIBED BELOW. 
 
Appellant Br. 29; App. 19. 
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overshadowed by other aspects of the letter and was sufficiently prominent to put 
Jewsevskyj on notice of her right to contest the debt.  Jewsevskyj appeals. 
II5 
 Congress passed the FDCPA to “eliminate abusive debt collection practices by 
debt collectors.”  15 U.S.C. § 1692(e); see also id. § 1692(a) (“There is abundant 
evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many 
debt collectors.”); Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 2000).  One 
way the FDCPA accomplishes this goal is by requiring that debt collectors provide 
certain information to consumers about their rights and obligations, including their right 
to seek information about and dispute a debt.  See  § 1692g.  Congress specifically 
provided a means by which a consumer can obtain information about a debt through the 
debt validation provisions of § 1692g.  Caprio v. Healthcare Revenue Recovery Grp., 
LLC, 709 F.3d 142, 148 (3d Cir. 2013).  Under § 1692g, a consumer must be told that he 
or she may dispute a debt and that the debt collector will provide the consumer with 
                                              
 5 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1692k(d).  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary.  Mylan Inc. v. SmithKline 
Beecham Corp., 723 F.3d 413, 418 (3d Cir. 2013).  We apply the same standard as the 
District Court, viewing facts and making all reasonable inferences in the non-movant’s 
favor.  Hugh v. Butler Cty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 266-67 (3d Cir. 2005).  
Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  “A 
dispute is genuine if a reasonable trier-of-fact could find in favor of the non-movant.  A 
dispute is material if it could affect the outcome of the case.”  Lichtenstein v. Univ. of 
Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).  The moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law when the non-moving party fails to make 
“a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has 
the burden of proof.”  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). 
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documents that verify the existence of the debt, list the amount of the debt, and identify 
the creditor.6 
 To comply with § 1692g, more is required than merely reciting the words of the 
statutory debt validation notice provisions in the debt collection letter.  Wilson, 225 F.3d 
at 354.  “[T]he required notice must also be conveyed effectively to the debtor.”  Id.  
Whether the validation notice is effectively conveyed to the debtor is evaluated “from the 
perspective of the ‘least sophisticated debtor.’”  Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 111 
(3d Cir. 1991).  The fundamental purpose of this standard is to ensure that the statute 
                                              
6 Section 1692g(a) provides: 
Within five days after the initial communication with a consumer in 
connection with the collection of any debt, a debt collector shall, unless the 
following information is contained in the initial communication or the 
consumer has paid the debt, send the consumer a written notice 
containing— 
 
(1) the amount of the debt; 
 
(2) the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed; 
 
(3) a statement that unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of 
the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt 
will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector; 
 
(4) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing 
within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is 
disputed, the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of 
a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or 
judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector; and 
 
(5) a statement that, upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty-
day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and 
address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). 
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“protects all consumers, the gullible as well as the shrewd.”  Caprio, 709 F.3d at 149.  
The least sophisticated debtor standard is therefore “less demanding than one that 
inquires whether a particular debt collection communication would mislead or deceive a 
reasonable debtor.”  Campuzano-Burgos v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 550 F.3d 294, 
298 (3d Cir. 2008).  Nevertheless, “the standard does not go so far as to provide solace to 
the willfully blind or non-observant,” and so “the least sophisticated debtor is bound to 
read collection notices in their entirety.”  Id. at 299.   
Though the debtor is expected to read the collection letter, reviewing the 
validation notice must not be a struggle: instead, it “must be in print sufficiently large to 
be read, and must be sufficiently prominent to be noticed” by the least sophisticated 
debtor.  Graziano, 950 F.2d at 111; see also Wilson, 225 F.3d at 355.  Moreover, “the 
notice must not be overshadowed or contradicted by accompanying messages from the 
debt collector.”  Graziano, 950 F.2d at 111.  A communication overshadows the 
validation notice when other language and/or physical characteristics of the letter feature 
more prominently than does the notice.  See Wilson, 225 F.3d at 356.  A communication 
contradicts the validation notice when it provides information inconsistent with the 
consumer’s right to dispute the debt.  See id. “[W]hether language in a collection letter 
contradicts or overshadows the validation notice is a question of law.”  Id. at 353 n.2. 
 Here, although the format is compressed and the font is small, our inquiry focuses 
on whether the notice is free from language or formatting choices that contradicts or 
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overshadows the notice.7  There is no language that contradicts the notice and the 
recipient’s right to obtain information about the debt.  Moreover, because the notice 
language is in the same font and format as the rest of the letter, there is nothing more 
prominent than the notice.  See Wilson, 225 F.3d at 356 (holding that validation notice 
“presented in the same font, size and color type-face” as the rest of the letter did not 
violate § 1692g).  Furthermore, the notice is placed on the first page of the letter and is 
written in plain English.  While font size and format could render a notice unreadable, we 
cannot conclude that the notice here fits in that category as it is concise and legible, and is 
not misleading, confusing, or overshadowed by anything else in the letter.  Cf. Graziano, 
950 F.2d at III (concluding that demand on front of letter which contradicted validation 
notice on reverse side did not effectively communicate rights under § 1692g).  Thus, the 
District Court correctly concluded that the letter does not violate § 1692g. 
III 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm. 
                                              
 7 Jewsevskyj failed to challenge the letter’s content before the District Court, and 
thus any argument concerning its content is waived. 
